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Drawing of Fort Brooke, ca. 1825, showing
the L. Sutler, K. Bakehouse, and I. Public
Storehouse located along the Hillsborough
River. (Courtesy of the P.K. Youn,ge Library
of Florida History, Special Collections,
Smathers Libraries, UnitJeTsity of Florida.)

n January 4, 1836, the young
Second Lieutenant Benjamin
Alvord of the Fourth Infantry
wrote to the Quartermaster
General of the United States Anny, General
Thomas Jesup, that the Schooner Motto
had just left the post for New Orleans. Its
mission was to obtain ammunition for the
recently arrived pair of twelve pounders
and the small arms then in Fort Brooke.
Alvord then added the telling portion: " ...
being continually in apprehension of an
attack from the Indians the commanding
officer decides that these materials Furniture &c of Motto cannot be turned over (as
no officer can properly leave his command)
... "I Three days prior to this the new commander of the post, Captain Francis S.
Belton of Maryland, commented that the
defenses of Fort Brooke were recently
extended and strengthened and that the
original cantonment had been entirely
abandoned. The women and children of the
casualties of Dade's recent battle were
shipped off to New Orleans. Brevet Major
John Mountfort, another recent arrival, also
noted the improvement of the defensive
works which now included a trench, new
pickets and blockhouses. The total regular
force available to defend the new works and
the remains of the nearby village were one
hundred and eighty men and officers plus a
party of citizen rangers numbering about
thirty. One hundred friendly Indians were
encamped outside of the works and
declared their readiness to fight their
brethren.2 Quoting a letter from "a
gentleman attached to Major Mountfort's
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command," the National Intelligencer council. When the U.S. government agent
allowed the author to declare: "Through the did not get the answers or lands demanded,
interposition of Providence, I am now alive he often recommended that the governto let you know it. We are really in the the- ment ignore that "chief'' and deal only with
ater of war of the most horrible kind." This someone more pliable. That person would
same writer was one of the lucky ones then be recognized as "chief'' and new nescheduled to ride out and overtake Dade's gotiations would be conducted until the decommand and join in the march to Fort sired result was reached. The tribal council
King. His group was delayed long enough to was totally ignored. The clan system upon
meet the three survivors, "horribly man- which much of the political power within
gled" who gave them the news of Dade's the Native cultures worked was also
demise.3
brushed aside as so much poppycock. The
Fort Brooke, on that terrible day, was government and its agents were ethnocentotally isolated and withtric to the extreme.
out means of defense
Within this very simpliagainst a massed attack
fied scheme no mean" all the Plantations
by the Seminoles and
ingful treaty could ever
South of Tampa were
their allies. The Decembe agreed to and underdestroyed. . . . They ha'Ve
ber 28, 1835 battle had
stood.
cost the command at
The Second Semiraised the Tomahawk in
Fort Brooke one hundred
nole War was, in many
despair, they are waging ways, a continuation of
and twelve men and left
a war of extermination
only the sparse garrison
the First Seminole War
described above. The fort
and
the internecine
and the Safety of our
had been strengthened
warfare that followed.
fellow citizens requires
but the outlying buildThe final Indian Agent
that not a moment
ings of the nascent village
before the war, Wiley
had been destroyed, "in
Thompson,
continued
should be lost in carrying
order to afford no cover
the government's polithe war into their own
by which the approach of
cies and attempted to
country."
the foe might be facilitatget the Seminoles to
ed." Like their colleagues
emigrate from Florida
Letter from General Richard Keith Call, Florida
in Key West they had
to Indian Territory west
Militia, to Florida Territorial
Governor John Eaton, January 7, 1836
cleared a field of fire
of the Mississippi River.
and gave the enemy no
Thompson's
manner
chance of surprise atwas haughty and insulttack. 4 The news did not improve with the ing. He continually addressed the Seminole
knowledge of the defeat of the force under negotiators as if they were the President's
General Duncan L. Clinch at the Withla- children or court appointed wards. After he
coochee River on December 31, 1835. There was killed, on the same day as Dade's force
would be no immediate relief by land.
was eliminated, Alligator declared that the
What brought on this isolation, fear and warriors danced around his hung scalp and
imminent threat of death? One of the major mocked his language and mannerisms. He
causes of the Second Seminole War (1835- would no longer insult anyone.s
1842) was the constant and consistent lack
Without belaboring the complex origins
of understanding between two differing of this most brutal war, it is worth noting
cultures; one European, the other Native that the white lust for land, cattle and othAmerican. The government of the United er property was a major driving force toStates refused to listen to those who knew ward war. Recent work by historian Ronald
the Native American culture best and in- Satz indicates the constant problems that
sisted upon discussing issues and signing arose with the initiation of the Indian Retreaties with "the chief'' of the tribe. It sim- moval Act and the bureaucracy it created.
ply ignored the advice that Creek, Seminole The lack of staff in Washington to oversee
and Miccosukee culture relied upon a tribal the Indian Agents, often corrupt political
council in which no individual chief had appointees, the insufficient funding of the
any power to conduct negotiations and removal by Congress, the parsimonious
enter treaties without the approval of said allotments for the military establishment

assigned to carry out this policy and the
overall planning deficiencies of the government all helped to create an impossible
situation. Many of these difficulties began
long before Andrew Jackson became president but they did not improve with his, and
subsequent, administrations.6 From the
initial confusion over supplying the Indians
in Florida, through the contract with Benjamin Chaires, to the insensitive administration of Wiley Thompson, the policy of
removal in Florida was replete with errors,
confusion and corruption. The final outbreak of war was not a surprise to anyone.
In 1823, the Treaty of Moultrie Creek
decided the ultimate fate of the Seminoles
and the other Native Americans living in
Florida. Their final fate was to be removal
but for the beginning of United States occupation of Florida, a reservation was decided
upon and surveyed by James Gadsden.
This army officer had earlier recommended
the Tampa Bay area as an ideal position
from which to control any possible foreign
influences upon the Seminoles and their
cohorts. 7 Tampa Bay was ideal from Gadsden's point of view because "The Indians
have long been in the habit of keeping up an
intercourse and active trade with the
Cuban fishermen, and to this cause, principally, has been ascribed the encouragement
hitherto given to absconding negroes, and
the savage depredations committed on cattle, estates, &c. "8 This constant theme of
interdicting trade between the Cuban fishermen on the Florida coast and the Seminoles plays an important role in why Tampa
Bay was chosen for the site of Fort Brooke.
Gadsden's letter also introduces the problem of the escaped slaves that has been at
the center of academic discussions concerning the Seminole Wars. There can be
no disputing the fact that this facet of
Southern society was a major trigger for
the Second Seminole War. With the founding of Fort Brooke in 1824, and the arrival
of the agent for dispersing the rations to the
Seminoles, the stage was set for the events
of 1836.9
As noted above, the situation Captain
Belton and the garrison at Fort Brooke was
desperate. The Florida militia would be of
little assistance in the defense of the area,
so help could not be expected from this
quarter either. By 1835, the militia situation
in Florida was, at best, pathetic. Although
Governor William P. Duval had requested

240 muskets and 250 rifles for this force in
1832, Florida had received only 198 obsolete firearms from the Federal Government.
Assuming that the arms supplied to the
militia was a guarantee of effective use was
beyond reality. The reality was that the
militia of Florida, even with the arms provided by the government or from personal
ownership, was neither large enough to
handle the situation at hand nor effectively
trained in the basic elements of military
drill, use of firearms or tactics. At the outbreak of the war, there was not one registered gunsmith in the entire Territory.IO
Belton could not and did not expect any
help from this source.
After learning of the fate of Dade's
command, Captain Belton had to quickly
assemble a resourceful defense. On January
2, 1836, he took the friendly Indians
camped outside of the stockade into the
service of the United States. This force
numbered about ninety to one hundred
men and would be used to threaten or
attack the rear of the enemy. As it was
impossible for emigration of the Indians to
take place under the circumstances, the
captain felt these friendly Indians would be
of "infinite service" to the post.11 Three
days later, Belton wrote to W.C. Bolton,
then commanding at Pensacola, "This place
is now invested by all the Florida Indians in
the Field with a large force of Negroes, particularly from the plantations of Tomoka &
Smyrna, as appears from the examination
of a prisoner just taken." The captain continued: "The fleet of transports . . . are of
course, in alarm, & without arms & subject
to an attack, & as far as I can judge, from
the flanking movements of the Indians,
down the bay, they intend either an attack
on the island between the Transports & this
post, where the friendly Indians families are
posted, till they can be shipped." Belton
concluded his letter declaring: "We have no
communication with any post in Florida & I
am of the opinion that 7500 men could not
force it at present." He then requested of
Bolton all the arms and men he could spare
for the defense of Fort Brooke.12 In a second letter to Bolton, Belton stated: "We are
prepared for the most desperate assault
they can make, inspirited as they are by the
action at Withlacoochee on the 28th. "13
While Belton was worried about facing the
entire Seminole nation and its allies at
Tampa, Governor John Eaton and General
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Drawing of Fort Brooke, ca. 1825. (Courtesy of the P.K.
Youn,ge Library of Florida History, Special Collections,
Smathers Libraries, Unitlef"Sity of Florida.)
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Richard K. Call were writing out their notes
on recent events. Eaton addressed his letter
to Secretary of War Lewis Cass on the 7th of
January: "Our troops & the Indians (400 in
number) have had a fight on the bank of the
Amaxura river [Withlacoochee's old name].
The loss of the Indians is about fifty - no
prisoners. The battle lasted for an hour,
Gen'l Clinchs regulars are the principal sufferers. Fifty or sixty are wounded & five or
six killed." The governor then erroneously
stated that Wiley Thompson had died in
this battle, demonstrating the problems of
communication during war on the frontier.14 Call wrote to Eaton on the same day
noting: "The precise strength of the enemy
has not been ascertained. It is variously estimated by men of intelligence to be from
1200 to 2000." The General continued:" ...
all the Plantations South of Tampa were
destroyed. . . . They have raised the Tomahawk in despair, they are waging a war of
extermination and the Safety of our fellow
citizens requires that not a moment should
be lost in carrying the war into their own
country." Call also observed that the country favored the Indians' style of warfare and
that an army of 2,500 to 3,000 should be
immediately sent to the field.IS Captain
Belton, from his isolation in Tampa, could
do nothing to prevent the destruction of the
plantations south of his position.
Governor Eaton, on the 9th of January,
wrote again to Cass hoping for more rapid
action from that quarter. He once more
related the necessity of disbanding the
Spanish fishing ranchos in southern Florida
where, he charged, "no doubt aid & encourage the Indians, under their fishing pretext. "16 Yet, Captain Belton says little at
this juncture about Spanish assistance to
the Indians. He did not, however, remain
idle and penned up in his stockade. On the
12th of January, he led a command out of
the post and toward the end of the day captured one Indian. This prisoner was from
the Peace River encampment and provided
Belton with some information he hitherto
had not possessed. The Indian informed the
captain that there had been an additional
battle fought between the Miccosukees and
the militia on the Alachua prairie (Paynes'
Prairie) and that the whites had fled the
field [which was substantially correct]. He
also opined that another engagement had
taken place on the Santa Fe River but
offered no specifics. The same prisoner also

declared that the Miccosukees were supposed to have attacked Fort Brooke the
previous evening, but did not. Belton then
informed Roger Jones, adjutant general
of the army, that he was affixing bayonets
to poles stuck in the ground and covering
them with twigs and leaves in the hopes
of breaking up any direct assault on the
fort.17 Belton was taking no chances and
doing the best job possible under trying
circumstances.
Over in Havana harbor, Commander A.
J. Dallas also heard the news. As commander of the United States West Indies
Squadron he had the responsibility to take
charge of any demands made upon him for
the defense of the country. He immediately
went into action. After ordering all the
marines he could spare from the fleet to
Tampa Bay, and a detachment of seamen
from the fleet to look after the light house at
Cape Florida, he headed toward Key West
in his flagship, the Constellation.18 By the
17th of January the marines were on the
way to Fort Brooke where they would assist
the army and the Territory of Florida until
August of 1836.19 The immediate need was
not just for the fleet vessels of the squadron
but also shallow draught vessels of the Revenue Service to reach closer to land and
penetrate up Florida's shallow waterways.
At the behest of Governor Eaton and Territorial Delegate Joseph White, the Treasury
Department was prevailed upon to order its
valuable cutters to aid in the military effort.
The cutters Dexter, Washington and Dallas
were soon doing yeoman's service and providing much needed relief to coastal inhabitants and the army.20 Again, one of the
missions of the cutters was to intercept any
trade between the Spanish fishermen, Cuba
and the Indians.21 Belton was much appreciative of the sending of the marines and
the arrival of the cutters because he had
discovered a plan to attack the fort by the
combined forces of Micanopy, Osceola, and
Little Cloud. The arrival of the marines may
have been the deciding factor in why this
attack did not materialize.22
Governor Eaton was also seeking reinforcements for the beleaguered station and
had even suggested that the army begin a
campaign from Tampa moving down the
western side of the peninsula. At the same
time he offered the concept of sending
troops to Charlotte Harbor and rescuing the
inhabitants there, and then sending an

additional force up the Peace or Myacca
Rivers in a sort of pincer movement to cut
off the Indians in that area. In addition to
the inhabitants of the fisheries in Charlotte
Harbor, there was also a customs collector,
Dr. Crews, and his family stationed there.
Crews had already been a few years on the
job at the time of the outbreak and knew
most of the local Indian and Spanish fishermen. So far removed from any type of military force, he was in immediate danger and
Charlotte Harbor was more isolated than
Tampa Bay. It was thought that Eaton's suggested plan of operations would crush the
Indians on the west coast and save the inhabitants and collector at the same time.23
The arrival of the marines under Lieutenant N.S. Waldron was one of the more
important events in forestalling an attack
by the Seminoles and their allies. With detachments from the Constellation and the
St. Louis, it was an obvious signal that other troops were on the way. Arriving aboard
the Vandalia and the other transports, this
force greatly augmented the numbers visible to spies. The Vandalia remained in the
harbor, too, which added an imposing spectacle for the attackers to contemplate.24
With the almost daily arrival of supplies
from the numerous transports the Seminole
leadership was quick to realize that other
troops and ships would soon be in the area.
The obvious build up of men and materiel
could only mean one thing to this enlightened group, it was time to rethink their
stn1tegy.
The obvious landing of the forces of
General Edmund P. Gaines at Fort Brooke
probably signified the end of any real danger to the fort and nearby settlers. However,
his landing almost did away with the post!
In a letter to Captain Thomas Webb, commander of the Vandalia, Gaines outlined
his immediate plans. In this letter of February 10, 1836, Gaines proposed using the
marines and crews of the navy to transfer
the men, inhabitants and Indians from the
post to the empty transport ships in
the harbor for better security. He asked the
captain if he would allow this action to take
place under the protective guns of his proud
ship. Gaines was contemplating using the
entire garrison force, including the
marines, to go to the relief of the forces at
Fort Drane (Clinch's partially fortified
plantation home in northern Marion
County).25 Gaines was still thinking of

abandoning the post on the 13th of
February when Captain Webb notified
Dallas of the proposal. With the arrival of
the Louisiana Volunteers under General
Persifor Smith, the need for the garrison
troops was lessened and it may be presumed that this arrival saved the fort for the
time being.26
As word of the Seminole attacks in
Florida reached the rest of the nation, the
people of the neighboring and other southern states began to volunteer for service in
Florida. These fresh troops were under few
illusions as to the nature of the enemy. In
its January 29, 1836 edition, the prominent
National Intelligencer noted the tenacity of
the Seminoles and their allies: "The Indians
themselves, heretofore a conquered people,
and from whose energy no danger was apprehended, have been profiting from the
false security of the whites. Gaining experience from past defeats, and putting into
exercise their whole skill and resources,
have on a sudden started up a courageous
and determined host." The paper continued
in noting the tactics of the Seminoles: "Nor
have these rude sons of the forest displayed
any want of skill or foresight; on the contrary, they have manifested a wary dissimulation, celerity of movement, courage in attacking and a skill in retreating, subversive
of all our military plans. "27 This wily enemy
of white civilization lay in wait for the volunteers from South Carolina, Tennessee,
Alabama, Georgia and the District of Columbia. The nation was also getting ready to
send in one of its finest generals, Winfield
Scott, a true hero of the War of 1812.
Gaines' force soon left Tampa Bay and
headed toward the Withlacoochee where it
would meet with great difficulty and be rescued by the very forces it had come to
relieve. At the same time, General Winfield
Scott was amassing a large force of regulars
and volunteers for a push from the eastern
portion of the Territory in an elaborate plan
to entrap the Seminoles in a three-pronged
pincer movement. In early March, Colonel
William Lindsay, Second Artillery, arrived
in camp and proceeded to organize for the
coming campaign. Sent by Scott to move
his troops, the marines and a large contingent of Alabama volunteers northward
toward the Cove of the Withlacoochee,
Lindsay had difficulty from the beginning.
By the 13th of March, the column had
begun to move out toward the final staging

121

'f.

.~ If )..

.-

·

~A· I,\~~
· ar

-

GUI r. .tJnnl. /
'" . '
..

r

I

-1..-

•

.,,.,.

.
·~

....,, ..

......•
..."

. ( ....

..

... ....

"'

.... ....
r

.......

. .. ·.
.

..

u

t

~.:,_

.

; 01 : ti. r;;l ! ·T· J: :1 ::~ ;·~

..

_

..

•

Chart of Tampa showing Fort Brooke at the mouth of the Hillsborough River in the top right.
(Courtesy of the National Archi'Ves Microfilm Collection.)
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area, Chocachatti (near modem Brooksville). On the way, Lindsay decided to construct a post closer to their line of march
and ordered the building of Fort Alabama
(later the site of Fort Foster). Arriving too
late, and wasting time and energy firing
guns and scouting the area, the force never
made its rendezvous and turned around
and headed back to Tampa on the 31st of
March. They fought one major skirmish
along the way, but accomplished very little
except an almost continual quarreling
among the volunteers and Colonel Lindsay.
This was indicative of what would happen
to other grand plans during this war.28
By mid-March 1836, the forces of the
United States Army and Navy were working
to expand their knowledge of the area and to
send out several reconnaissance missions.
One of the earliest was led by U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Levin M. Powell, who led a

detachment of twenty-five men to the
shores of the Manatee River. The mission
discovered no Indians at the alleged camp,
but did see signs of recent activity including
a large number of foot prints and cattle
tracks. All seemed headed toward the area
of Sarasota Bay or further south.29 By the
end of the month, the command at Tampa
Bay was confident enough to send Lieutenant Powell with a force from the
Vandalia northward to the Anclote River
after reexamining the Manatee River to the
head of boat navigation. Most of the islands
between the Manatee River and the Anclote
River were explored for recent signs, but,
again, they found nothing. Powell attributed
the lack of signs on the Anclote Islands
to their distance from the mainland,
which made them difficult to access.30 The
Seminoles and their allies had apparently
fled inland to await their next battle.

Charlotte Harbor was examined at the
end of March by the U. S. Revenue cutter
Washington, under the command of Captain Ezekiel Jones. The command fell in
with a number of Indians camped at the
mouth of the Myacca River. About twentytwo Indians were seen in one body by the
boat under Lieutenant Smith and numerous fires were seen in the distance. The two
guides, both from Bunce's fishing ranchos,
proceeded ahead of the main body of men
and met with three of the "hostile" party.
They soon recognized each other and entered into a parley. The two intrepid guides
could not, however, ascertain the numbers
or size of the other encampments without
giving themselves away as enemy spies.JI
On April 2nd, Lieutenant Powell left the
Vandalia and proceeded to some of the
islands in Charlotte Harbor. Here Powell,
"found the inhabitants flying in every direction to escape the fury of the Indians." Upon examination of the collector's house, he
found it burnt to the ground and no sign of
Dr. Crews or his family. Sailing Master
Stephen C. Rowan was then dispatched to
the nearest mainland and came upon some
of those responsible for the destruction.
Rowan immediately attacked this band and
reported killing two and taking one captive.
The others escaped into the nearby woods
where Rowan's small force dared not go.32
The report filed by Lieutenant Powell indicates that the inhabitants of "Josepa" Island
were those he helped to rescue from the
clutches of Wy-ho-kee and his band.JJ
Captain M.P. Mix of the U.S.S. Concord
wrote on the 30th of April that there were
still some inhabitants left at Charlotte Harbor and that little protection could be offered them as the closest units were thirty
miles away. He also wrote to A.J. Dallas
that: "The Indians are assembling in all directions with a determination, as they
threaten, to destroy all of the fisheries in
the Bay and to bum the Transports at anchor in Hillsboro Harbor, or such of them as
may remain after the departure of the volunteers." Mix was concerned that the troop
strength and the condition of the stockade
made it possible, in his opinion, for the Indians to succeed. Mix also noted that General Scott had requested that the Concord
remain at anchor in the harbor and that
Lieutenant Waldron's marines also stay
aboard. He declared that a "state of anxiety" existed at Tampa Bay for want of

knowledge of the next moves by the Seminoles and their allies. Such a state of anxiety was probably unfounded but it is very
understandable given the successes of the
Indians in resisting the United States' best
generalship.
The high tensions at Tampa Bay were
likely to be increased as the news from two
other borders reached the area. In Texas,
the revolution for independence was drawing much of the national press interest and
there was daily discussion as to the role of
the United States in that conflict. Many
were in favor of sending regular troops into
the foray and committing the navy to a full
time blockade of Mexico. Regular voyages
were undertaken by the navy to gather
information and keep a watchful eye on the
developments there. Most of these sailings
came from the West Indies Squadron, thus
drawing away needed naval strength from
the Florida coasts. In the north, the revolt
in Upper Canada also drew away some of
the military attention and forces to guard
against any problems arising there. This
further depleted the military strength available to fight the Seminoles in Florida. As
the total military might of the United States
numbered less than ten thousand men at
this time, any venture away from the center
of action had possible dire consequences.
Even after the scoutings of the Manatee
River by the forces under Lieutenant Powell, rumors still persisted about a large force
of "Indian negroes" on that waterway. According to the St. Augustine Florida Herald
for April 23, 1836: "Three days ago two Indian negroes were taken - from one of
whom information was obtained of a negro
fort on the Manatee River, about 15 miles
south of Tampa Bay. Gen. Eustis had taken
up the line of march to attack. It was not
known how many negroes are in the fort,
but the negro stated there was a large number." Such gossip spread among the territorial newspapers like a wild fire and added
greatly to the anxieties of the population.
In mid-April, General Persifor Smith of
the Louisiana Volunteers and Captain Ross
of the U. S. Marines came on board the Dallas to discuss the coming short campaign
up the Myacca River, where the enemy had
been previously reported. From April 12th
to April 17th the men from the Vandalia,
Dallas and other smaller vessels prepared
for their adventure. For a while there was
some hope that the enemy would be found
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but after the troops' departure on the 18th
of April, little could be expected. Dr. Crews'
body, and that of his assistant, had been
found and it was presumed that most of
those responsible had already left the area.
This was confirmed when General Smith
and his forces returned with nothing much
to show for their extended efforts. According to the Florida Herald for May 12, 1836,
" ... there seems to be an opinion that the
Indian captured by Lieut. Powell committed the outrage on Dr. Crews, as he was employed in the boat of Dr. C. and was heard
to make threats to that effect previously."J4
By the end of April Fort Brooke was beginning to take on a familiar appearance.
According to one writer, stationed at "Shelton Camp, (16 miles from Tampa Bay)," the
fort was a breath of fresh air: "Tampa is a
beautiful place, with orange and pride of India trees in blossom, the sight of which was
reviving to us thirsty travelers in the desert.
The air acted on my lungs like exhilarating
gas."35 John Erwin of the Tennessee volunteers also observed the fort: "Fort Brooke
situated on Tampa Bay was a military post
of considerable importance as it was situated within the hollow of a curve in the bay it
was three parts out of the four surrounded
by water, its watch towers and sentinel
could be seen a mile before reaching it, our
camp was one mile north of the fort." Erwin
also raved about the abundance of oysters
nearby which he claimed made his men
"better and fatter immediately."36 These
observations differ significantly from those
recorded by earlier visitors prior to the
change in location. The old fort, at the time
of the earliest expeditions against the Seminoles, was described by W.F. Rowles, surgeon for the Creek Volunteers. Writing in
the Southron magazine in 1841, the doctor
recalled: "The appearance of Fort Brooke
during the stay of the Creeks was singularly
animating. The Barracks and store houses
are built facing the bay and the river Hillsboro, and present long rows of low combustible shanties, some of them whitewashed and neatly paled in with old staves
of barrels, tierces, &c. It was amusing," he
continued, "to see the taste and ingenuity
of our officers exerted in such a place, with
such means, to make their quarters comfortable. The post was guarded by a circle of
sentinels. The underbrush cut down for
some rods towards the forest and beyond
the Hillsboro." He too noted the watch tow-

ers and added that many of the tents were
lining the old streets among the orange
trees. Numerous cannon were to be seen
pointing "ominously toward all the approaches. "37 Alexander B. Meek noted in
his journal the existence of the famed Live
Oak trees and the numerous orange trees
on the grounds. He compared it favorably to
"an ornamental college green" and declared
the post impregnable against any possible
Indian attack.38 It should be remembered
that most of the small settlement had been
destroyed to create an open field of fire for
the garrison. The settlement contained
about thirty or forty families, all of whom
were considered quite poor.39
The beginning of May brought on sickness and it was reported that Fort Brooke
was no exception. According to the National Intelligencer for May 6, 1836, "There was
400 sick at Tampa Bay, and the climate was
getting worse and worse for the Army." This
report came on the heels of the Battle of
Thonotosassa. Here the forces sent back to
Fort Alabama to remove materiel and
equipment were fired upon by the Seminoles while attempting to cross Thonotosassa Creek. It was the hardest fighting any of
General Scott's forces faced in their time in
Florida. Members of the Fourth Infantry
and the Second Artillery were joined by the
Alabama Volunteers under Colonel William
Chisolm in a very spirited battle in which
two whites were killed and twenty-five
wounded (the majority of them from the
volunteer ranks). The loss to the Seminoles
and their allies is unknown. The fight lasted
about an hour and ended with a charge with
fixed bayonets by the regulars and volunteers. The battle also featured the use of
cannon to some effect, an unusual occurrence in this war. The Indians had chosen
their position well. It was on a curve in the
creek lined with dense hammocks. The first
fire, as is common in such battles, caused
the most damage to the U.S. forces. The
men then retired to Fort Brooke to recoup
and refurbish themselves. 40
May of 1836 not only signaled the onset
of the "rainy season," but it also saw the beginning of the agitation to remove the
marines back to Pensacola and other naval
assignments. Major Henry Wilson, then
commanding the fort, refused to release
Waldron's marine detachment for other
duties. He felt strongly that the security of
the post would be compromised if the
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Map of Tampa and Hillsborough Bay, showing Fort Brooke in the center at the mouth of the
Hillsborough River.(Courtesy of the National Archi'Ves Microfilm Collection.)

marines left at this juncture. Captain Mix,
of the Concord, disagreed with this assessment. Mix noted that there was a relative
lull in activity for the marines and that
much of their time was spent guarding
William Bunce's rancho at the mouth of the
bay. Wilson was waiting for either reinforcements or replacements for Lieutenant
Waldron's valuable force. Until such time as
either of these alternatives arrived, the major was not about to release the marines.
[They did not leave until August of 1836.)41
One of the more humanitarian gestures
found in this period of activity involved the
removal of the families around Sarasota
Bay, known locally as the Caldes Rancho.
On May 8th, Lieutenant Charles P. Childs of
the revenue cutter Washi~ton was ordered
to sail to Sarasota Bay and confer with "Old
Caldes" or his son. He was to convey to
them the danger to which they were ex-

posed and advise them to move to either
Tampa or to Bunce's Rancho were they
could be afforded protection. The settlers
were not eager to leave their homes and
were afraid that the army would separate
the families because many of the wives
were Indian. Many residents of the settlement had already departed when Childs
arrived; he did, however, observe about
twenty individuals living there at that time.
All were busy loading canoes, which were
filled to capacity, and were riding low in the
water. The only thing preventing the final
departure was the weather. 42
Early June found the army clearing out
the ever growing shrubs and weeds from the
open area. Making the post more inhabitable by larger numbers was also on the
agenda of the officers. Gardens which had
been neglected had to be tended and some
of the early crops harvested. In addition,
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three advanced redoubts were constructed band and others had to be accounted for
at this time. Colonel Lindsay and his force and rations distributed. Funding and rawere ordered on to Mobile, and his depar- tions for the "suffering inhabitants" also
ture was met with approval by many in had to be allotted to the settlers seeking
camp, especially the remaining troops from refuge in the area. One of the more emoAlabama. The only Indian activity reported tionally difficult tasks remained to be acin early June was that of a few raiding par- complished; the selling of the effects of the
ties who stole a number of cattle during soldiers killed in Dade's last battle and setnight raids. But it was the sickness that tling the debts of the officers, like Captain
worried Major Wilson, and he observed that G.W. Gardiner. The proceeds from the sale
the post had only one assistant surgeon, Dr. of the effects usually went into the compaReynolds. If this one medical officer should ny fund handled by the company commanbecome ill, the remainder of the post would der, but receipted through the paymaster
suffer. Like other shortages in the officer general of the army. 45 Such tasks were not
corps, the lack of medwelcomed by anyone in
ical officers was a severe
the company.
One of the more
handicap for the army
Fort Brooke and the
emotionally difficult
serving in remote areas.
settlements near Tamtasks remained to be
Wilson requested a secpa Bay were relatively
ond medical officer for
safe from the attacks of
accomplished; the selling
the post, however, the
the Seminoles artd their
of the effects of the s
post did not receive one
allies at the end of the
oldiers killed in Dade's
while he was in comfirst campaigns. The
mand. 43
last battle and settling the war had already seen
The usual diseases of
the defeats of armies
debts of the officers, like
the Florida summer hit
under Generals Clinch,
Captain G. W. Gardiner.
the troops hard. The
Call, Gaines and Scott.
various fevers, "bilious,"
Waiting in the future
The proceeds from the
"black vomit" and interwere the terms of Gensale of the effects usually
mittent, played havoc
erals Thomas Jesup,
went into the company
on the health of the
Zachary Taylor, Walker
army and navy. The volArmistead and William
fund handled by the
unteers also suffered
Jenkins Worth. Six
company commander, but more years of guerrilla
from
the
climate.
receipted through the
Colonel John Warren
warfare remained ahead
commanded the Second
for the army, navy,
Paymaster General of the
Military District for the
marines and volunteers.
Army. 45 Such tasks were
Florida Militia and reThe Second Seminole
not welcomed by anyone
ported, on June 9th, an
War was to be the longoutbreak of the "measeest continually fought
in the company.
les" among his troops.44
and most expensive of
This is no longer a seriall of the wars the Unitous disease in this day and age, but it was ed States fought with its Native Americans.
deadly to the frontier settlers and military This war brought glory to none of the politipersonnel. Mumps, too, made their appear- cal or military leaders and played a role in
ance in Florida in the 1830s but did not the increasing agitation against slavery, just
reach Tampa Bay. The army, because of the then beginning in the northern portion of
fevers' appearance in the summer months the nation. The panic and terror in the
and the deadly affects it had on the troops, Tampa Bay area during the first six months
seldom campaigned in the "rainy season" in of the war subsided into a near routine of
Florida. Not until Colonel William J. Worth shuffling the troops into and out of the tertook command in 1841 did Florida see a ritory and seeing to the emigration of most
summer campaign.
of the Seminoles, blacks and Miccosukees
The rainy season did bring on new ad- to the west. Those who survived those first
ministrative tasks for the commander and months of the war never forgot them. It was
garrison at Fort Brooke. Money for the em- a time to try the souls of all men, women
igration of the Seminoles of Black Dirt's and children of both sides.
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